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The use of income distribution indicators in the economics literature has
increased considerably in recent years. This work relies on household surveys
from 18 LAC countries to take a step back from the use of these indicators, and
explore what’s behind the numbers, and what information they convey. We find:
a) that the way countries rank according to inequality measured in a conventional
way is to a large extent an illusion created by differences in characteristics of the
data and on the particular ways in which the data is treated; b) Our ideas about
the effect of inequality on economic growth are also driven by quality and
coverage differences in household surveys and by the way in which the data is
treated; c) Standard household surveys in LAC are unable to capture the incomes
of the richest sectors of society; so, the inequality we are able to measure is most
likely a gross underestimation. Our main conclusion is that there is an important
story behind each number. This story influences our judgement about how
unequal countries are and about the relation between inequality and other
development indicators, but it is seldom told or known. Perhaps other statistics
commonly used in economics also have their own interesting story, and it might
be worth trying to find out what it is.
Keywords: Inequality, income distribution, economic growth, household
surveys, Latin America.
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Introduction
The use of income distribution indicators in the economics literature has increased considerably
in recent years. One of the reasons is that after a long period of stability, income distribution
started to deteriorate in many industrial countries, with sharper increases during the 1980s and
1990s.
1 This has attracted considerable attention and has contributed to the resurgence of income
distribution measures as qualifiers of economic performance.
Another reason is the renewed interest in income distribution as a variable that can help
explain other development indicators, such as the rate of economic growth.
2 This interest has
been strongly influenced by the appearance of the  Deininger-Squire (1996) database (DS
henceforth) on inequality indicators for the world. The database mainly relies on published
estimations from household surveys–which are perhaps the best source of information for the
measurement of income inequality–to considerably improve on previous efforts of gathering
information for comparisons across countries and over time.
As noted by Atkinson (1997), the literature on the measurement of inequality and the
surge in statistical evidence on income distribution allowed by the availability of household
surveys, have outpaced the development of the theory needed to interpret the facts. This situation
will most probably prevail because of easy access to the DS data, the recent appearance of the
World Income Distribution Data base (1999) by WIDER,
3 and the renewed efforts by countries
and international agencies for holding household surveys, will result in an even more widespread
and intensive use of income distribution indicators in the years to come.
The objective of this work is to take a step back from the use of household survey data
for the purposes mentioned above and to explore what’s behind the inequality we measure. Our
approach should be viewed as a statistical or even an accounting exercise that intends to provide a
clearer idea about what inequality measures taken from household surveys are really informative
about. Our main goal is not to explain inequality. In this sense, the paper is similar in spirit to
Atkinson and Brandolini (1999), who have subjected the DS data to careful scrutiny and pointed
out the dangers of using this kind of information without knowledge about its noise-to-signal
ratio.
4
                                                       
1 Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995), Atkinson (1998), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1998), and
Plontchick et al. (1998), among others, have documented this fact.
2 Benabou (1996), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1994), and Panizza (1999) are among the long list of
works on this issue.
3 UNU/WIDER-UNDP World Income Inequality Database, Beta 3, 8 November, 1999, which builds on DS
and offers an expanded version of this data set.
4 For another discussion of the drawback of secondary databases, see Pyatt (1999).6
We would like to stress that criticizing secondary data sources such as DS is not our
objective. Rather, we try to contribute to the literature by pointing out the issues that users of
indicators derived from household survey data should take into account for their analysis and for
interpreting the evidence generated with these kinds of statistics.
5
The paper takes three approaches for looking at what’s behind the numbers. The first two,
which are more of a statistical exploration, refer (i) to the importance of fleshing out the
differences in the characteristics of the data and (ii) to the relevance of being explicit about the
way in which the data is treated. The last, which is more economic-oriented, focuses on
identifying what type of individuals are behind the inequality we measure.
Each of these approaches is relevant for at least four important issues. First the analysis
provides a better idea of what each of the numbers is really measuring. Secondly, there are
important implications for the ranking of countries. It is normally perceived that countries with
relatively low inequality must be doing something right. Therefore, if our impression about the
rankings changes when we take into account differences in the data or when we choose to treat
the data in a different way, knowing what’s behind the numbers will be crucial for making better
judgments. The same argument applies to the third issue, which is the effect of inequality on other
economic indicators. Finding out more about these numbers will allow for a better interpretation
of the correlation between income distribution measures and other variables. Fourth, once we
know better what type of information inequality indicators convey we will be in a better position
to explain the causes of inequality.
Surprisingly, our analysis shows that the impression obtained about the ranking of
countries in terms of inequality, and that our ideas about the effect of inequality on other
development indicators, can be a mere illusion caused by differences in the characteristics of
household surveys, and by the way in which the data is treated. This does  not imply that
household surveys or international data sets are not useful, but rather, that to improve the
interpretation of any result, it is necessary to take these issues into account.
To look into each of the topics mentioned above, this paper uses household surveys for
18 Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries. Although it is possible that our
conclusions are specific to these cases, we believe that there are important lessons for other
countries, and especially in the use of secondary international data sets. We focus on Latin
America because we are more familiar with this data, and we restrict the analysis to household
                                                       
5 In their paper, Deininger and Squire (1996) themselves point out many of the caveats of their database.
The authors were careful enough to warn about the comparability problems of the data they put together,
but these warnings are seldom taken into account by users.7
surveys–rather than, for instance, censuses or tax records–because this is the most widely used
source of information for measuring inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the data. Section 2 explores the
importance of accounting for differences in the characteristics of household surveys. Section 3
examines the importance of methodological consistency and making explicit the choices made in
calculating inequality indexes. Section 4 shifts from  a statistical to an economic-oriented
approach by asking who is behind the inequality. Section 5 concludes.
1.  The Data
This paper extensively uses household surveys from 18 Latin American & Caribbean  (LAC)
countries for the most recent year available to us.
6 The data covers 94% of the total population of
the region. The earliest survey is for 1993 (Nicaragua), while we have three for 1995 (Ecuador, El
Salvador and Paraguay), seven for 1996 (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Honduras, and Mexico), six for 1997 (Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and
Venezuela), and one for 1998 (Guatemala). Appendix Table A1 presents more information about
each survey.
All but two surveys apparently fulfill the “good quality” requirements of the Deininger-
Squire data, which are that: (i) the data has to contain information on all income sources; (ii) the
unit of observation is the household or the individual; (iii) the data is representative at the national
level.
7 The surveys for Argentina and Uruguay do not fulfill the last condition because they only
cover urban areas, but they meet the other two. We include them because they are usually used
for comparison within LAC, and since these are highly urbanized countries, the surveys cover
most of their population (more than 90% in Uruguay and around 70% in Argentina). Throughout
the paper we refer to Argentina and Uruguay without further clarification of their restricted urban
coverage, but it is important that these differences be borne in mind.
As a benchmark for comparison in the rest of the paper, we estimate inequality in each
country with what we call the “conventional” Gini. This estimate refers to the inequality of each
                                                       
6 Some of these surveys were obtained through MECOVI, a program sponsored by the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank, and ECLAC to collect and organize the existing household surveys in
Latin America and to promote the implementation of new ones. The rest of the surveys were obtained
directly through country statistical offices.
7 The word “apparently” is written in italics because some of the household surveys used here also appear
in the DS data presumably because they meet requirements (i) to (iii) but, as we show later, a more careful
look at them reveals that some do not.8
individual’s household per capita income calculated by using sampling weights, dropping all
missing and zero values, using the standard definition of the household unit, and using the widest
possible definition of income. No adjustments for differences in the data are performed. We call
this measure “conventional” because, among the studies in LAC that document the methods used
to compute inequality (which is a minority), the Gini is estimated in this standard way.
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Table 1 presents the conventional Gini (multiplied by 100) and ranks LAC countries from
most to least unequal.
9 There is a group of four countries (Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Panama)
with the greatest inequality, and which are highly unequal by any standard. For instance, if
compared with all the “good quality” observations in the Deininger-Squire data beyond 1988,
they appear to be among the 5 most unequal countries in the world (only after South Africa
1993).  Another group of highly unequal countries follows, with Gini indexes between 55 and 57
points (Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala). Then we find Honduras, Mexico,
Peru and El Salvador, all with Ginis above 50 points. Finally, the countries with a Gini of less
than 50 points are Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Costa Rica and Uruguay, all of
which are still well above the world average of 40 points reported in DS.
The table also includes information for countries in other regions for reference and
confirms that all the LAC countries considered are highly unequal by international standards.
10
The regional average for LAC is by far the highest and there are only two individual countries–
Russia and the United States–with a Gini coefficient that is more or less comparable to the two
most equal Latin American countries. The other 16 LAC countries have much higher inequality
levels.
                                                       
8 Londoño and Székely (2000) review 111 studies on the measurement of poverty and inequality in the
region and conclude this. By standard definition of household we mean the unit including all individuals
that share the same budget, and where sub-units are counted as being part of the same household. The only
transformation to the data was that incomes were deflated when necessary by using the CPI.
9 In the cases of Colombia and Nicaragua, Honduras and Mexico, and Peru and El Salvador the differences
are only marginal, but we still rank the countries differently for expositional purposes.
10 The data for these countries was accessed through the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Inequality is
calculated with the same methodology as for the LAC countries, but in these cases, the definition of family
unit may not coincide with the standard used in LAC.9
2.  The Importance of Accounting for the Characteristics of the Data
For some economic indicators, such as the GDP of a country, a discussion about the quality and
characteristics of the data is rather uncommon. There are international conventions that countries
follow to produce this kind of information, so when the numbers are used for research or for
evaluating economic performance, their origin, how they are calculated, or the characteristics of
the data with which they were produced, are seldom under scrutiny. In the case of other equally
important indicators such as the degree of income inequality, this is not the case. Even though
there has been great improvement in the availability of inequality indicators, these numbers are
still far from being produced with similar methods and are far from uniform in terms of quality
and reliability. This issue is mostly overlooked in empirical research, and this section illustrates
the importance of taking it into account.
We consider three sets of issues: (i) the characteristics of the sample, (ii) differences in
survey quality and coverage of population groups, and (iii) differential coverage of income
sources and geographic areas and differences in timing.
11 One important issue that we are not able
to address due to the lack of data is that differences in policies across countries can have an
important effect on our impression about how unequal countries are. For instance, if a country
chooses to provide income transfers, which are captured by most surveys, the effect will be
measurable and its impact will be taken into account in the computation of inequality indexes.
However, if the choice is to provide price subsidies to consumption, the benefit may change the
distribution of welfare, but its effect will not be captured by inequality statistics.
2.1 Differences in sampling
Two of the most basic issues commonly overlooked when using household survey data are the
frame used to define sampling weights and the size of the sample. We consider them briefly,
since we are unable to perform adjustments to the data to determine their importance.
Typically the most recent census is used as a sampling frame, and when the year of the
survey does not coincide with a census year, the census data is projected. This would not be an
issue if the most recent census were within a 5-year interval, which is the period considered for
instance in the United Nations Population Statistics (1998) for their longest projections, but when
the period is greater, the degree of precision of the weights declines. If the weights overstate the
relative importance of less or more unequal population subgroups, inequality would be under or
                                                       
11 Deaton (1997) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) also discuss some of these issues.10
overestimated. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that in most countries the relevant sampling
frame is within 5 years of the year of the survey, but in Costa Rica and Uruguay the censuses of
reference  are 13 and 12 years apart, respectively. Unfortunately, we are unable to “adjust”
inequality measures to account for these differences because of the difficulty in determining the
sign and magnitude of the biases in the weights. So, other than documenting the facts, we can do
little more than bear in mind that these two countries have been going through intensive
demographic changes and have urbanized rather quickly, so it is possible that the use of outdated
weights is blurring the comparison. Interestingly, these countries are ranked as most equal in
Table 1.
The degree of precision of estimates from household surveys also depends on the size of
the sample because the larger the size, the lower the standard error of any estimate. In LAC,
samples range from 330,000 observations (individuals) in Brazil, to 11,905 in Argentina.
Furthermore, the sample relative to the population also varies markedly. It ranges from almost
2%, 1.5% and 1.1% in Uruguay, Panama and Costa Rica, respectively, to .07% in Mexico. On
average, the Gini index in all 18 countries has a confidence interval of .67 points, but the point
estimates in Table 1 are subject to larger estimation error in Paraguay, Ecuador, Nicaragua,
Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras and Peru, where the standard error is about 1 point of the Gini.
Figure 1 shows the confidence interval for each conventional  Gini. Some notable cases are
Ecuador and Nicaragua. The point estimate for Ecuador ranks the country as the 8
th most unequal
in Table 1, but the conventional Gini is not statistically significantly different from Panama,
which is ranked as the 4
th most unequal. Nicaragua is originally ranked in 6
th place, but after
considering the standard error of the point estimate, it could well belong to the group of the five
most unequal countries in the world. Thus, our impression about the ranking of countries in Table
1 is somewhat modified by accounting for the differences in the sample size of the household
surveys from which the estimates are drawn.
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12 As noted by Medina (1999), there are ways of  “adjusting” inequality indexes for sampling differences.
Due to the information requirements, we are not able to apply such methods here.11
2.2 Quality and Coverage of Population Groups
Cross-country inequality comparisons can be blurred by differences in the quality of the
information and by variations in the degree of success in defining a sample that is informative of
all sectors of society. Here we explore some ways of taking these differences into account.
Measurement Error in Household Surveys
One way of obtaining an idea about the differences in quality across surveys is to assess the
extent of some types of measurement error by focusing on indicators of misreporting, which are
informative of the capacity of each survey to capture income with a higher degree of precision.
This is actually one of the main quality concerns from the perspective of the measurement of
inequality, because, for instance, if two countries have the same level of “real” inequality but in
one the degree of underreporting among the rich is more severe, income distribution will appear
to be better in one of them when in reality it is not.
Income misreporting is generally caused by two problems. One is that some incomes are
particularly difficult to measure. This is typical of informal sector self-employment and small
agricultural businesses, but also of the richest individuals, who usually have diversified portfolios
with income flows that are not easy to value. Some surveys are better at minimizing these types
of measurement error through the inclusion of specific questions on businesses, micro enterprises,
the value of assets, and the returns to assets, but most are quite limited. The second problem is
that some individuals may choose to underreport their income deliberately, even if they have a
precise idea of its value. If underreporting is correlated with income or with income sources
typically earned by specific sectors of society, it will introduce biases in inequality estimates.
13
Theoretically speaking the bias can be positive or negative, but generally the richest individuals
are more reluctant to disclose their assets and wealth, so underreporting tends to result in an
underestimation of inequality.
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998) argue that one subgroup of the population subject to
larger income measurement error due to the first problem is the self-employed. For these
individuals it is usually difficult to distinguish what part of their income can be attributed to
wages, what is the return to physical capital investment, and what is the value of their profit.
Thus, the larger the size of this group the higher the proportion of the population potentially
subject to misreporting.
                                                       
13 Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998) discuss these issues in detail.12
The first column in Table 2 shows the proportion of self-employed in each of the 18
countries under analysis. For LAC as a whole 28.1% of the income earners are engaged in this
type of activity, and in half of the cases the proportion is within one standard deviation from the
LAC mean. Since surveys have limited information, if any, on the operation of micro enterprises
and the finances and accounting of the self-employed, it is difficult to correct for differences in
measurement error in this group by transforming the data in some way. Therefore, one of the only
options is to compute the conventional Gini by excluding the group under the idea that the self-
employed are suspected of being subject to larger error. Table 2 presents the result, as well as the
new ranking of countries.
14 Even though the correlation between this indicator and the
conventional Gini is positive and quite high (the coefficient is .86), there are some important
ranking reversals. The main changes are that Guatemala and Peru appear to be relatively much
more unequal than before. The position of El Salvador also deteriorates, while the position of
Nicaragua improves substantially.
15
Coverage of Socioeconomic Groups
An implicit assumption in using nationally representative income distribution indicators is that
the statistics measure inequality among all individuals in society. Since household surveys use
samples, it is known that not all individuals are included, but the fact that some subgroups are
more likely to be underrepresented is seldom addressed. In particular, if the richest individuals are
not sampled or are underrepresented, inequality will tend to be lower. Therefore, one indicator of
survey quality is if the instrument is really able to capture information for the whole spectrum of
income earners. The poorest of the poor and the richest of the rich are usually the hardest to
sample and if there are quality differences in the capacity to incorporate information on them, our
impression about how unequal countries are can be misguided.
One way to assess the differences in population coverage across countries is to compare
the lowest and the highest incomes in the surveys. This may give a good idea about the
socioeconomic groups covered, and about the type of inequality each survey is measuring.
                                                       
14 The results are only evidence of the potential importance of differences in measurement error, because
we are not able to control for the direction of the bias and for the fact that some countries are better at
capturing the incomes of the self-employed than others. Furthermore, the comparison entails a significant
loss of information.
15 One way of partially evaluating the importance of misreporting due to the second problem mentioned
above is by comparing the incomes in the surveys with some benchmark. In Table 2, we adjust the incomes
for each labor income earner in the surveys so that the aggregate matches the labor income in the National
Accounts and then add up total household income and recompute the  Gini. This adjustment has only
marginal implications for the ranking of countries, which suggests that underreporting of labor incomes, at
least when accounted for in this way, is not an important source of variation across countries.13
Table 3 presents some information on this. The first column shows the monthly income in US
dollars for the 10 poorest households in each country (we exclude all missing and zero household
incomes for this comparison). The amounts are strikingly low. On average the 10 poorest
households earn a total income of US$7.76 a month, which by any means is insufficient to cover
the minimum necessary for survival. Although this may most likely constitute evidence of
measurement error at the bottom of the distribution, it also confirms that all surveys capture at
least to some extent the incomes of the poorest individuals.
The second and third columns present the monthly average income in US dollars of the
10 richest households and the richest person in the survey, respectively.
16 The results range from
an average household income of around $38,000 in Brazil, to around $6,000 in Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Honduras and Bolivia. The income of the richest person in the survey ranges from $162,404
in Paraguay (which is a clear outlier), to a surprisingly low $7,000 in Costa Rica and Honduras.
In Chile and Brazil, the income for the richest observation is also relatively high (of around
$60,000), while in Mexico and Ecuador, the top observation registers an income around $40,000.
In the rest, the incomes seem strikingly small, especially considering that these are regarded as
the richest individuals in each country, at least in the household surveys. The case of Venezuela
stands out in these comparisons. By LAC standards, this is a middle-high income country in
terms of GDP per capita, and according to the surveys, the richest individual earns a monthly
income of around $15,000, which seems implausible.
To obtain a better idea of how large or small these top incomes are, we include in the
table the monthly disposable income in USD of a manager of a medium to large size firm
obtained from an independent business survey.
17 We choose this benchmark because managers of
medium to large size firms are highly educated professionals who do not typically fit the profile
of the richest individuals in any of these countries. The comparison with the benchmark is quite
striking (last two columns of table 3). On average, in the 16 countries for which information is
available, the total income of the 10 richest households in the survey is very similar to the average
wage of a manager. In 10 countries, the average income of managers is actually higher than the
income of the 10 richest households. In Brazil, Guatemala, Chile and Uruguay, the income of the
richest is between 1.3 and 1.93 times greater than the income of the average manager, which is
still far below expectations. Only in Ecuador and Paraguay does the income of the 10 richest
households exceed the income of managers by a factor of more than 2. A similar conclusion
                                                       
16 We do not include the result for Colombia here because the Gini for this country is conventionally
calculated by top coding incomes, so the highest observations are not usually used.
17 The source is America Economia (1999), pg. 76-77, which reports the results of an independent survey
by Price Waterhouse.14
applies to the comparison with the richest individual in the survey. In 9 out of 18 cases, the
income of the richest individual is less than 1.5 times the income of an average manager. In
Ecuador, the ratio is 5.76, and only in the case of Paraguay is the comparison within expectations
(in this country the richest individual earns 26.56 times more than the average manager).
But even in the case of Paraguay and Ecuador it cannot be said that household surveys
have full coverage of the richest individuals. To illustrate this, Figures 2a and 2b plot all incomes
in the survey. Figure 2a shows how the richest individual in Paraguay is a clear outlier.
18 This
income is almost 11 times greater than the second highest observation, which reports a monthly
income of $16,000. In the case of Ecuador, the richest individual is also an outlier with an abyss
between this observation’s income and the rest. The cases of Chile and Brazil are not as extreme.
These two surveys apparently capture incomes above the average of managers, and as can be seen
in Figures 2c and 2d, the coverage of high incomes is more widespread than in Figures 2a and 2b.
Two other interesting cases are Venezuela and Mexico. As reported in Table 3, the richest
individuals in the surveys earn incomes that are much lower than the typical manager in the
country. But what is more surprising is that the highest incomes in the surveys of these countries
are still outliers in spite of their low value (see Figures 2e and 2f).
One important conclusion that emerges from these results is that inequality is grossly
underestimated because of extremely limited information on the richest individuals, but that the
degree of underestimation differs from case to case.
19 For instance, the relative position of Chile
in Table 1 is rather unfavorable while the position of Venezuela is better. According to Table 3,
however, this  may in part simply reflect that the Chilean survey is better able to capture
information on the richest segments of society. Only Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, Ecuador
and Paraguay seem to capture incomes above the level typically earned by managers of medium
to large firms, and interestingly, with the exception of Uruguay, these are all countries with
relatively high inequality according to the conventional Gini.
                                                       
18 We confirm that the observation is not dropped in conventional computations of inequality for this
country.
19 The differences in coverage among the rich could be due to differences in survey quality, but it is also
possible that they are a normal consequence of random sampling. If there are two countries with exactly the
same distribution of income and exactly the same number of rich persons, the random selection of
observations among the rich groups could result in higher inequality in one case if, by chance, a richer
individual is included in the sample. In any case, our results show that whatever the cause, there are
substantial differences in coverage of the richest sectors of society across the Latin American countries
under study, and that these differences can affect income rankings.15
2.3 What Do Surveys Capture, Where are they Applied, and When?
One of the most important differences across household surveys is that a common definition of
income sources is not applied across countries. The omission of different sources affects
inequality because some types of income are better distributed. If all surveys omitted the same
source, the lack of information would not bias the comparisons and would not be an issue in their
use for regression analysis. But at least for the LAC countries considered here, this is not the
case.
20
Table 4 aggregates incomes into 4 different categories: labor income, capital rents,
property rents and non-monetary income. If capital rents and property incomes are grouped
together in a single question that asks about all non-labor income, the shaded area appears in the
second column only. We make this distinction because capital and property rents tend to be
concentrated among the richest households, and when questionnaires have specific questions for
these sources their accuracy is improved, and this may have an effect on inequality estimates.
As shown in Table 4, all surveys include a separate question for labor incomes, and
Honduras and Nicaragua are the two cases where the surveys only capture this source. In half of
the countries there is an explicit question about capital and property rents, respectively, while in 7
cases all non-labor income is grouped together in the same question. Furthermore, one of the
most important differences is that only 7 countries include information on non-monetary sources,
and of these, not all include estimations for imputed rents.
The differences are rather surprising since all the countries in the table (except for
Argentina and Uruguay, which are urban surveys) supposedly meet the good quality requirements
in the DS “high quality” data and are regarded as including all income sources. The surveys in the
table, or similar ones for the same countries for previous years, are actually included in the DS
database in spite of the differences in income source coverage. Some notable cases are the
inclusion in the DS data of a series of Mexican surveys covering the wide range of sources
specified in Table 2, along with information for Nicaragua 1993 and a series of surveys for
Honduras which only consider labor incomes.
Table 5 illustrates what happens to our impression of the ranking of countries when,
rather than comparing the conventional Gini, we restrict the estimation of inequality to a more
comparable definition across countries. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the inequality of labor incomes,
which is actually the only income definition that is strictly comparable across the 18 cases. The16
relative position of 8 countries changes by more than one place when we rank according to this
more comparable concept. Bolivia, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, and especially Colombia now
appear to be countries with relatively lower inequality than before, while Chile and particularly
Mexico and Guatemala appear to be much more unequal.
We also estimate the Gini for labor incomes in urban areas, which is strictly speaking the
minimum common denominator across all 18 countries. Column 5 and 6 in Table 5 present the
ranking according to this measure. In 12 out of the 18 countries, countries are re-ranked by more
than one position. These changes are somewhat expected, due to the large differences in the share
of the urban population across countries, but are still illustrative about the importance of
comparability across countries. Now Bolivia does not appear to be the third most unequal
country, but is repositioned in 10
th place. The ranking of Peru also improves significantly, since it
now appears to be the second most equal country. The relative positions of Chile, Mexico,
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic deteriorate substantially, and most importantly, the
relative position of Argentina and Uruguay is less favorable when the countries are ranked
according to the minimum common denominator.
One difference that is usually overlooked in using income distribution indicators from
household surveys is that surveys are held at different times of the year in each country.
21 This
becomes an issue if economic activity follows a cyclical pattern or if the composition of
households changes due to  seasonality.
22 For the sectors of the population that have stable
employment in the formal sector and receive wages irrespectively of the time of the year this may
not be an issue, but it is typically important for the self-employed and for individuals employed in
the agricultural sector. The larger the latter groups are, the greater the potential bias introduced in
international comparisons by differences in timing.
Table 6 marks the month of the year over which each survey is performed. The first
feature is that there are three cases (El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay) where the
                                                                                                                                                                    
20 All of the LAC countries for which we have information report after-tax incomes in household surveys
so we do not need to worry  about comparability in terms of net or gross income, as is common in
developed countries.
21 Another potentially important issue is that recall periods for income could differ. However, Table A1 in
the Appendix indicates that recall periods across the LAC countries in our sample are very similar. The
only case where the period exceeds 1 month is Guatemala. In Mexico, surveys ask about income receipts in
each of the 6 months prior to the survey. We only use information about income during the previous month
to make it comparable with the rest of the countries in LAC.
22 A fixed effects regression performed with data for the LAC countries in our sample for the period 1980-
1998, and by using quarterly GDP (from International Financial Statistics (October, 1999)) as dependent
variable and dummies per quarter as independent variables, reveals that on average GDP in the second
quarter is 3.73 times larger than in the first. For the third and fourth, the difference is 0.94 and 3.39,
respectively. Therefore there is high cyclicality during the year.17
questionnaire is applied over the whole year. Among the remaining 15 cases, there are a few
where the timing of the survey coincides. In 7 cases, there is an overlap during the month of
September, but in four of them not all the observations are captured during this month. The rest of
the countries are scattered around the calendar year.
In an attempt to assess, at least in a general way, the effect of these differences on
country rankings, we perform a regression using the 18 surveys analyzed so far, and add
observations from 37 other LAC surveys which are representative at the national level, and for
which we also have direct access and full documentation (see Appendix Table A.2 for a
description). The additional national surveys included in the estimation are detailed in Appendix
Table A2, and refer to almost the same set of countries considered so far, but for earlier years.
Argentina, Uruguay, and several earlier surveys for Bolivia that are available to us are excluded
from the estimation because they refer only to urban populations. With the 55 nationally
representative surveys to which we have access, we estimate the following random  effects
regression:
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where all the independent variables are dummies. d(non.mon) takes a value of 1 if the survey
captures non-monetary incomes and zero otherwise; d(non.lab) indicates that the survey reports
non-labor income; d(cap.rent) is given a value of 1 when the survey questionnaire explicitly asks
about the amount of capital incomes received, rather than grouping all non-labor income in the
same question; Q2, Q3, and Q4, are dummies for the quarter of the year over which the survey was
held, while d(year) takes a value of 1 if the survey was held during the course of a whole year. ei
is the residual.
The regression yields a gross estimate of the average effect on the conventional Gini of
having or not certain household survey characteristics, while controlling for others.
23 The
                                                       
23 We restrict the number of independent variables in the regression because it is performed strictly for
descriptive purposes, and not with the objective of explaining inequality. Anyhow, it may still be argued
that there is a potential problem of omitted variables bias, and that the coefficients are also capturing the
effect of variables that are correlated with inequality and also with some survey characteristics. Since there
is no widely accepted model of inequality, we perform the regressions including parsimoniously the share
of rural population (which might affect seasonality and the efforts to include specific income sources), the
share of population of working age to control for demographics (which might affect the importance of
transfers and self-employment), and a measure of factor endowments developed by  Spilimbergo  et.al.
(1999), as well as a proxy for financial depth measured by the coefficient of M2 over GDP, to account for
the importance of capital incomes. The absolute value and significance of the coefficients in both
regressions change only marginally when including each of these variables at a time, or all together, so we
don’t present them for brevity.18
coefficient is presented in parenthesis below each variable. The inclusion of non-monetary
incomes is associated with about 6.5  Gini points more.
24 Having information on non-labor
incomes is associated with 9.8 more points of the Gini, while including an explicit question for
capital rents is associated with 8.5 points less. Surveys held during the second and fourth quarters
of the year typically have a Gini of around 6.7 and 3.8 points less, while those held in the third
quarter have 3.5 points more. Surveys carried out throughout the year have on average 10.6 points
more.
We interpret the residual ei in each equation as the conventional Gini purged from
differences in the household survey characteristics included in the regression. We call this
“adjusted” Gini, and the results for each country’s most recent observation (which we have been
using throughout the paper) is presented in Table 5. The results should be taken with caution,
since the number of  observations (55) is quite reduced and the dummies for some of the
household survey characteristics specified in the equation can be capturing country effects. We
regard these results only as a first approximation to obtain a general idea about the importance of
household survey differences. Although Argentina and Uruguay are not included in the
estimation of equation (1) because they have only urban surveys, we also present the adjustment
for these countries. In the case of Argentina the result should be taken with more caution because
the adjustment does not take into account differences in geographic coverage. However, in the
case of Uruguay, where most of the population is urban, the adjustment seems to make more
sense.
The last column in Table 5 indicates the difference between the rank according to the
“adjusted” Gini and the conventional Gini. In many cases the re-rankings are quite important.
According to the adjusted Gini, the most equal countries are Uruguay, Costa Rica (both of which
do not change rank) and El Salvador, while the most unequal are Ecuador, Paraguay, Brazil and
Mexico. Surprisingly, Argentina now ranks much less favorably than before, and is not even
among the 9 most equal countries. Colombia is now ranked as number 15 rather than 10, while
the position of Nicaragua improves substantially. The relative positions of Panama, Guatemala
and Nicaragua are now much more favorable, while the position of Venezuela worsens in a
significant way.
Therefore, countries that are usually regarded as relatively equal in LAC turn out to be
much more unequal when the survey differences are accounted for, at least in this very general
way. The rankings in Table 1 now appear more as an illusion created by differences in the
                                                       
24 This result is in line with the effect found by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998).19
household surveys from which the data is drawn, rather than being genuine disparities across
countries.
2.4 Are the Differences Relevant for the Growth-Inequality
Relationship?
As indicated in the introduction, one of the main reasons why the use of income inequality
indicators in the economics literature has surged in recent years is because of the renewed interest
in the relation between growth and inequality. During the 1950s and 1960s the conventional view
was that greater inequality led to higher rates of growth. More recent evidence, however, points to
the opposite conclusion: that inequality has negative effects on growth.
25 This view has been
disputed by Forbes (2000), who recently showed that with the use of the DS data and the
application of improved estimation techniques, the conclusion is that there is a positive
relationship between the two variables, which takes us back to the idea that inequality is favorable
for growth. In this subsection we add to this controversy by exploring whether incorporating
more information about the household survey characteristics discussed above changes our view
about the relation between these two indicators.
As a benchmark for comparison, we take the base regression in Forbes (2000), which
uses the specification in equation (2). This is similar to the one used by Perotti (1996), which is
one of the standard references in the literature for the negative relation between growth and
inequality:
t i t i it it it it it it u PPPI Educf Educm LnGNPpc Gini Growth , 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 + + + ¶ + ¶ + ¶ + ¶ + ¶ + ¶ = - - - - - h q
(2)
where LnGNPpc is the log of real GNP per capita in 1987 $US for country i in period t, Educf
and Educm refer to the years of secondary education of females and males over 25 years of age,
and PPPI refers to a measure of market distortions proxied by the price level of investment. q is a
set of country dummies and  h are period dummies. Forbes’ main results are obtained by
estimating equation (2) for the 1966-1995 period by using growth rates over five-year intervals
rather than yearly observations. The first column in Table 7 reproduces one of the basic results of
                                                       
25 Benabou (1996)  and Aghion et al. (1999) summarize the empirical and theoretical aspects of this
literature, respectively.20
the paper, obtained with a fixed effects estimation.
26 As can be seen, inequality has a strong
positive effect on growth.
Ideally, we would like to re-estimate the regression by incorporating information on the
specific income sources and timing of each household survey to check whether our impression
about the effect of inequality on growth holds when the differences in the data are taken into
account.
27  Since we do not have direct access to all the household surveys in the DS database, we
restrict our analysis to the set of surveys in Appendix Table A2, which were previously used for
the estimation of equation (1).
 28 However, this imposes some restrictions. Since we have a more
limited number of observations and countries, it is not possible to aggregate the observations in
five-year intervals, so we estimate the equation by looking at the growth rate between the two
periods for which a Gini index is available. The definition of the intervals will therefore depend
on the availability of information on inequality.
29
Before presenting our results with the LAC sample, we perform a regression to check
whether the changes in method required for the LAC estimation have an effect on the coefficients
or significance of Forbes’ regression. The second regression in Table 7 is a fixed effects
estimation using the same DS data for the period 1965-1995 but instead of grouping the
observation in five-years intervals, it estimates the regression by defining each interval as the
period between two years for which a Gini is available.
 Period dummies are substituted for year t
dummies.
30 Even though the sample size and number of countries vary with respect to the first
regression, the results lead to the same (although weaker) conclusion that inequality has a positive
effect on growth. This assures that the change in method needed for the following estimations
                                                       
26 This corresponds to regression (1) in Table 3 in Forbes (2000). The main results of the paper are based
on the fixed effects estimation as well as other techniques. We focus only on the fixed effects because the
number of observations in the LAC data we use later is only suited for this method.
27 One issue we do not examine, but which can also be important, is aggregation. As noted by Ravallion
(1998) aggregation can create spurious effects of inequality on growth.
28 18 of these observations actually appear in the DS data set. The correlation between the 18 Gini indexes
that are both in our sample and in DS, is .74.
29 Since the timing of the Ginis in our LAC sample do not always coincide with the years for which
information on education is available, we interpolate  Educf and  Educm to increase the number of
observations in the regression. The use of all the information without grouping incorporates the effect of
short-term disturbances and increases serial correlation from business cycles, but as will be shown, this has
no implication for our conclusions.
30 As in Forbes (2000), the Gini coefficient is taken from the DS good quality data set, education variables
come from Barro-Lee, the log of GNP per capita is taken from the World Bank World Development
Indicators 1998, while the index of price level of investment is from the World Penn Tables. The
coefficients for the period dummies are not included for expositional purposes. 6.6 points are added to the
Gini coefficients that refer to the distribution of expenditures, to be consistent with the first regression in
Table 7.21
does not affect the overall conclusion of the positive statistically significant relation between the
two variables.
The third regression in the table replicates the previous regression, but we substitute the
DS data for the conventional Gini indexes computed from the LAC household surveys with
national coverage, to which we have direct access (Table A2).
31 The magnitude of the coefficient
on inequality, initial income and PPPI are smaller than in the first of the regressions in the table,
while the significance level is also slightly lower. The number of observations is reduced (42 after
calculating growth rates) and the number of countries is also limited to 11. However, the
conclusion that inequality and growth are positively and significantly related holds.
As mentioned previously, we know that the surveys in the LAC sample used so far and
many of those included in the DS data are not strictly comparable for several reasons. We are able
to document the differences thoroughly in the case of income sources and timing and can
therefore attempt some adjustments to increase comparability in the LAC data. One option is to
reduce the definition of income to the minimum common denominator, which will guarantee that
the variance in the independent variable will be “real” and not an artificial variation introduced by
differential income coverage. Additionally, this will allow for a much more transparent
interpretation of the results, because we know precisely what type of inequality is being
measured.
The fourth equation in Table 7 replicates the third regression, but substitutes the
conventional  Gini for the  Gini of labor income, which is comparable across countries.
Surprisingly, the coefficient for inequality is reduced quite dramatically in size, and loses its
statistical significance, while the sign and magnitude of the other coefficients is not modified in
an important way.
We also perform the regression with the “adjusted” Gini discussed above, rather than the
conventional or the labor income Gini. This has the advantage of also incorporating information
on differences in timing across surveys. The fifth equation in Table 7 shows that surprisingly, our
impression about the effect of inequality on growth is different than in equations (1) to (3) in this
case also. The coefficient for the Gini is much smaller than before, but most importantly, it does
not have a statistically significant relation with growth.
We would like to stress that the objective of the estimations in Table 7 is not to take a
position regarding the effect of inequality on economic growth. In fact, the results should be
interpreted with caution and cannot be regarded as solid evidence for the hypothesis that
inequality is harmful or beneficial for growth. Our sample size, period coverage and number of22
countries are too limited for this. We also stress that we do not intend to contest the conclusions
from Forbes’ estimation because information on the characteristics of all the household surveys
from which the DS data are derived is not available to the author or us. Our intention is simply to
determine whether or not knowing more about the origin of the inequality measures is important.
The results in Table 7 are quite striking because they show that our impression about the effect of
inequality on other development indicators can be a mere illusion caused by differences in the
characteristics of the data. Once this information is taken into account, the conclusions change.
3.  Treatment of the Data
Apart from the differences in household survey coverage and characteristics, there are several
important choices and assumptions behind inequality measures which are usually not accounted
for in international secondary data sets and cross-country comparisons.
32 For instance, to compute
the conventional Gini, we have implicitly assumed that: (i) each member of the household has the
same needs; (ii) there are no economies of scale in consumption; (iii) missing and zero incomes
are unreliable and are better to ignore; and (iv) the best way to summarize the information on the
distribution of income is to compute the Gini coefficient. These four choices are reasonable, but
they are by no means the only options. We have used them because in LAC it is standard to
estimate inequality in this way, but in other regions, alternative methods, which are as valid or
even more adequate, are traditionally employed. For instance, as noted by Atkinson, Rainwater
and Smeeding (1995), there is a tradition in OECD countries of applying adult equivalence scales
to account for some economies of scale in consumption and to impute missing incomes, but these
practices are not common in LAC. This is an important issue because even in the absence of
differences in the quality and characteristics of household surveys, international comparability of
income distribution indicators is still not guaranteed if there are cross-country differences or
variations over time in the way in which the data is treated. This section first explores how
sensitive the LAC country rankings are to changing the methodology consistently across
countries. We then examine the implications of not applying the same method in all cases.
Finally, we look into the importance of the choice of inequality measure.
Other important issues in data treatment are, first, the use of income adjustments to
correct for price variations across regions. The way these adjustments are performed or their
                                                                                                                                                                    
31 The regression does not include period dummies due to the loss of degrees of freedom.
32 One of many examples is the introductory chapters to the volume by Ganuza, Morley and Taylor (1998).23
neglect can have significant effects  on  Gini coefficients, and, perhaps, country rankings.
33
Second, as shown by Ravallion and Chen (1999), inequality indexes are also highly sensitive to
the prices used in the estimation of non-monetary incomes, and specifically the estimation of auto
consumption. Third, as explained by Pyatt (1999), it is not uncommon to find that some authors
reweigh the observations in household surveys to make them match, for instance, with aggregates
in the National Accounts. We do not address any of these issues here due to data limitations.
3.1 Household Size, and Missing and Zero Incomes
So far in this paper household per capita incomes have been used as a welfare indicator for the
measurement of inequality. Perhaps the clearest way of making explicit what this choice implies
is to express each individual’s income as:
(3) 















where y is the income assigned to individual i belonging to family t, Y is total household income
of household t, and n is the total number of household members. Each member of the household
is scaled up or down by an adult equivalence scale b specific to each individual, indicating the
share of household resources allocated to i.
34 a is a parameter whose value is between 0 and 1
that accounts for economies of scale in consumption. Calculation of income per capita is
equivalent to defining b=1 and a=1, which assumes that each individual within the household
has the same needs, and that there are no economies of scale in consumption. As restrictive as this
might appear, it is standard practice in LAC and other regions. Since the household size for
individuals living in households at the bottom of the per capita income distribution tends to be
larger, attributing a value of 1 tends to overestimate inequality.
Table 8 presents the Gini index calculated with alternative values for b and a.
35 To allow
for economies of scale in consumption, we define a=.5, which is the value commonly used in
                                                       
33 Two good illustrations of the importance of this issue are Ravallion and Chen (1999) and Ferreira et al.
(1999).
34 b generally varies by age and gender. The extensive literature on the estimation of equivalence scales has
been recently reviewed by Deaton (1997) and Cowell and Mercader-Pratts (1999).
35 Individual incomes can be computed by using a two-parameter formula (Lanjow and Ravallion,1996),
but here we have varied b and a one at a time to verify if the Gini is more sensitive to one of the two
parameters.24
studies for developed countries.
36 According to the first column in the table, the average Gini in
LAC is reduced from 53.27 points to 51.11, but there are only few ranking reversals with respect
to the conventional Gini. Another estimation of interest is to assign a=0, which implies the
extreme assumption of “full” economies of scale. We obtain the results for this specification, but
the calculation is restricted only to household heads, so it is equivalent to calculating the Gini
over fractiles of households rather than individuals. In this case also, the re-rankings as well as
the change in the average Gini across countries are not important, so we do not present them for
brevity.
In the third column we estimate inequality using the Amsterdam equivalence scale
explained by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), which has commonly been used in the literature for
developed countries.
37 The average Gini with this scale is 2.5 points lower than the conventional
measure, and again, the ranking of countries is quite stable.
Thus, when a methodology is applied consistently across countries for accounting for
economies of scale in consumption and equivalence scales, the country rankings do not change
significantly, although the Gini is more sensitive in some cases than in others. This does not mean
that the choice of b and a is unimportant. Rather, it illustrates that even if the methodological
choice varies, it will not blur the country comparison as long as it is consistent across countries.
In the following subsection we show that the pattern is considerably distorted if there is a lack of
consistency across countries.
Missing and Zero Incomes
For computing the conventional Gini we follow standard practice in LAC and exclude missing
and zero incomes. Usually the justification for doing so is that these observations are unreliable
and introduce more noise than signal into the measurement of inequality. As noted by Juster and
Smith (1998) and Pyatt (1999), missing values tend to be correlated with capital incomes, and are
generally due to the unwillingness of the rich to disclose their wealth. Zero incomes are usually
regarded as not plausible, but it is not that clear whether they are associated with specific income
sources, income levels,  and  socioeconomic characteristics, or if they represent a precise and
reliable answer to survey questions at all. It should be noted that zero incomes do not refer to
                                                       
36 See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1998).
37 There are few LAC-specific equivalence scales. We also performed the calculation by using the scale in
Contreras (1996), which was calculated for Chile. The change in the Gini was smaller than the result with
the Amsterdam scale, so we do not include it for brevity. Due to the lack of country specific scales, we25
individuals not earning income, but to individuals who declare being engaged in a productive
activity but not receiving remuneration for it.
Excluding zero and missing values from the computation of the Gini is, however, only
one among several options. In fact, Little (1988) argues that discarding missing values can entail
important information losses, and the remaining observations may no longer be representative of
the whole population under analysis. To reduce non-response bias it is possible to apply
weighting adjustments or to use information in the household surveys to impute an estimated
income for missing observations as is commonly done in developed countries (Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1998). We may also choose to believe that individuals reporting zero income are
providing reliable information, or alternatively, we can impute incomes for zero income
respondents, rather than discarding them.
The third column in Table 8 presents the proportion of observations with missing and/or
zero values in the 18 countries in our sample. In about half of the cases the number is negligible,
but in others such as Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Argentina the proportion is above 16% of the
sample. The last columns of the table explore the effect of either imputing missing and zero
values or imputing missing values and taking zero incomes at their face value. Since there are few
total non-responses in the surveys, we mostly focus on item non-responses, which are imputed by
following a two step procedure. The first step consists of estimating income regressions for each
source separately, where each individual’s income is the dependent variable, and the independent
variables are all personal and household characteristics in the surveys. The coefficients are used
to predict each income-earner’s income for that source, including non-respondents. The second
step consists of ranking all income earners of the source in question (including non-respondents)
according to their predicted income. For non-responses, the error term is calculated by averaging
the residual of the observation immediately above and below, and the total imputed income
corresponds to the predicted plus the estimated residual. Household incomes are added up after
the procedure. The same method is applied when imputations are performed on individuals
reporting zero incomes.
38
The ranking reversals in the last column of Table 8 are quite important. Nicaragua
appears to be the most unequal country in LAC instead of Paraguay when, rather than discarding
missing and zero values, we choose to impute the missing and “believe” the zero incomes. The
                                                                                                                                                                    
have applied the same criteria for each of the surveys. It should be noted, however, that estimations of
equivalence scales can vary substantially from country to country (see Lancaster, et al., 1999).
38 We tried several combinations of dropping and imputing missing and zero values one at the time. The
results we present are the options under which larger variation was identified. Brick and Kalton (1996),
Kalton and Kasprzyk (1986), and Rubin (1987) review other methods for dealing with missing values.26
relative position of Venezuela also deteriorates in an important way, while the Gini for Argentina
increases by more than two points.
Table 8 treats all household surveys in the same way and shows some important
reversals, but, as with the case of the choice of b and a, the effect could be magnified if a
consistent methodology is not applied in each household survey.
3.2 The Importance of Methodological Consistency
Since secondary data sets based on compilations of Gini coefficients from published sources mix
a range of methodological choices, at least in part, the differences in inequality in international
comparisons–especially across regions with different traditions in the use of b(i) and a–may be
artificial variation caused by different parameter choices rather than genuine distributive
differences. Since the choices are usually not documented, it is difficult to measure the magnitude
of the biases. The same issues arises with the treatment of missing and zero values. For instance,
if we discard missing and zero values in Venezuela but impute missing and use zero incomes in
Argentina, rather than treating the two countries in the same way, our impression about the
relative inequality in these two cases would change, and they would be regarded as having
practically the same  Gini. Another example is that the DS data includes an observation for
Nicaragua 1993. If the authors of the study from which the observation was drawn had chosen to
“trust” the zero incomes reported in the survey, Nicaragua would appear to be the most unequal
country in the world, and would have the highest Gini coefficient in the whole DS data. Our
impression about the record of this country, and most probably other countries in terms of income
distribution, is thus being blurred by the subtleties in the treatment of the data.
Since we have access to the original micro observations of each of the LAC household
surveys used so far, it is possible to apply the same methods across countries, and to document
what they are. Take for instance the ranking of the conventional Gini in Table 1. The three
implicit choices in the calculation are b=1, a=1,and that zero and missing incomes are unreliable
and should be thrown out of the sample. There are several ways of handling missing and zero
values, but if they were restricted to two choices: 1) throw these observations out, and 2) impute
missing incomes and take zero incomes at face value, then the Gini could be represented as a
choice of three parameters, G(b, a, m),  where m defines the treatment of missing and zero
incomes, and takes a value of 1 or 2, depending on the choice. The conventional Gini is the case
where G(1,1,1).27
One way to assess the importance of the lack of methodological consistency that plagues
secondary databases and compilations from published sources is through the following
experiment. We take the 18 LAC countries used so far, and rather than applying a consistent
methodology across countries, we assign a methodology randomly to compute the  Gini.
Specifically, we define four possible methods: (i) G(1,1,1), which is the conventional Gini; (ii)
G(.5,1,1), (iii) G(1,Amsterdam scale,1),; and (iv) G(1,1,2). Thus, in each case we change one of
the parameters and hold the others as in the computation of the conventional Gini. The process
for assigning a method has two steps. First, we order countries randomly. Second, we choose the
first country, and assign one of the four methods randomly to compute the Gini. Then we take the
second country and replicate the process, and so on. After doing this for all 18 cases, we rank the
countries according to the Gini computed with a random methodology, and compare them with
the original ranking. Since secondary databases and compilations of  Gini coefficients from
published sources have a mixture of methodological choices, this process of random selection
may in fact be closer to the variety found in those sources, than to estimates such as those
presented in Table 1, with the same method applied consistently.
Table 9 presents the results from six different draws from the above experiment. The first
column ranks countries according to the conventional Gini, so for every case the methodology is
G(1,1,1). The second column introduces “noise” into the comparison by estimating the Gini of
each country with a randomly assigned method (indicated next to the country code). The number
of re-rankings is quite surprising, especially considering that we are only varying one parameter
at a time. The relative positions of Panama, Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, Chile, Nicaragua,
Venezuela and Mexico change significantly, and interestingly, there are only three cases where
the methodology corresponds to the fourth option  G(1,1,2), where differential treatment of
missing and zero values is allowed for, and which introduces more cross-country variability. The
third column presents a second draw, where there are also considerable re-rankings. The last four
columns present other four draws, and in every case the relative position of many countries
changes. In the last two draws, one and two cases, respectively, correspond to the fourth option,
and still we observe several re-rankings. The most notable are for the Dominican Republic, Peru,
Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua and Ecuador. The only country that is not re-ranked in these six
drawsis Uruguay, which remains the most equal throughout.
Since we introduce “noise” randomly, each time we perform the experiment we obtain
different results, so we tested with 50 draws and we always observed at least four re-rankings.
Although the random draws will not match exactly the variability introduced in secondary data
sets by the lack of methodological consistency, we think that the exercise is still illustrative about28
the potential “noise” introduced in these databases or compilations of  Gini coefficients from
published sources. The lack of documentation of the methodological preference for each
observation magnifies the problem and increases the probability that country rankings are to an
important extent an illusion caused by differential treatment of the data.
To verify whether this is also an important issue for the growth-inequality relationship,
we perform the same experiment of random allocation of each of the four methodologies
described before, but now for our complete set of 55 household surveys used in the growth
regressions in Table 7. So, rather than estimating equation (3) in the Table with the conventional
Gini, we estimate the same regression but the dependent variable is chosen by assigning
randomly one of four different Gini coefficients (corresponding to the four methods) to every
country-year observation. We experiment 50 times, and present in Table 10 the results from five
different draws that illustrate the range of results obtained.
The first column corresponds to a case where the results are very similar to those
presented in Table 7 with the conventional  Gini as dependent variable. Thus, even after
introducing “noise” in the data by using different methods, it is possible to obtain similar results
as before, although the following results suggest this is only by chance. The second column
presents another estimation, where the  Gini has been “contaminated” by methodological
inconsistency. It is interesting because, even though the conclusion about the relation between
growth and inequality is the same as in the first column, the magnitude of the coefficient for the
Gini index is about double the size. The third regression, corresponding to another random
allocation of methodology, stands out because the coefficient for the inequality variable in the
equation is statistically insignificant, and the size of the coefficient is negligible compared to the
previous two. The fourth draw is the regression where we obtain the highest ‘t’ statistic for the
Gini in our 50 trials. But perhaps the most striking is the fifth draw, where inequality and growth
are actually inversely related, although the coefficient is not statistically significant.
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Although our results are subject to a number of caveats, they confirm that the “noise” to
signal ratio in data sets where methodological consistency is not guaranteed can be very high. Our
experiment suggests that the “noise” has the potential for completely blurring the picture about
how unequal countries are with respect to others, and about the relationship between inequality
and other economic indicators such as the rate of growth. In secondary data sets we simply do not
know how loud the “noise” is, but it definitely can be very misleading, even if the differences are
restricted to only three parameters of choice.29
3.3 Choice of Inequality Measure
The Gini is the most common inequality indicator because it has several advantages such as its
intuitive interpretation. But it is still only one among many equally valid options for summarizing
the information on the distribution of income and, as  with any other inequality measure,  its
calculation is based on a set of assumptions. One of the main characteristics of this index is that it
gives greater relative weight to the middle portion of the distribution.
One way of illustrating the range of options for measuring inequality is to use the family
of entropy measures described by Cowell and Jenkins (1995). These indexes are expressed as a
function of a parameter that changes in value according to the sector of the distribution to which
more weight is attached. High values of the parameter yield “top sensitive” measures, while low
values yield “bottom sensitive” indexes. Two countries with similar Gini coefficients can have
very different top or bottom sensitive indexes if there are disparities between them at the
extremes of the distribution.
Table 11 presents the ranking of countries according to two alternative indexes. The first
refers to a bottom sensitive index with parameter value of approximately –1, while the second is a
top sensitive index with parameter value of about 1. In the case of the first index the relative
position of several countries shifts, with the greatest changes being observed in Venezuela,
Ecuador, Guatemala, and Brazil. The top sensitive index also yields important ranking reversals,
especially for Ecuador. Still another option is to compare differences along the whole
distribution, instead of focusing on some specific section. A standard Lorenz stochastic
dominance test in Figure 3 specifies which distributions unambiguously dominate the others,
when comparing each centile. According to the figure, the distribution for Paraguay dominates (is
more unequal than) the other 17 countries. Brazil, Bolivia and Panama dominate the rest of the
countries, but their Lorenz curves intersect, so it is not possible to rank them unambiguously. A
group including Colombia, Nicaragua, Chile and Ecuador, who do not dominate each other,
follows. One unambiguous conclusion is that Uruguay and Costa Rica are the countries with the
lowest conventional Gini, but the most relevant aspect of the Table 11 and Figure 3 is that our
impression about how unequal each country is with respect to the others might change when we
consider the whole distribution, or alternative summary measures of inequality.
To explore if there are also implications for the relation between inequality and growth,
we replicate regression 3 in Table 7, but by substituting the bottom and top sensitive indexes for
the conventional Gini. In this case we also use our wider LAC sample of 55 surveys with national
                                                                                                                                                                    
39 This is one of the 4 cases in our 50 draws where the coefficient for the Gini is negative.30
coverage. Table 10 presents the results, which are subject to the same caveats as the previous
regressions in Table 7.
Surprisingly, when the estimation is performed by using a bottom sensitive entropy index
the conclusion about the relation between inequality and growth changes quite drastically, and is
actually reversed. Inequality now appears to have a negative effect on growth, with significance
at the 10% level. However, if a top-sensitive entropy index is used instead, the conclusion is that
inequality and growth are positively related.
40 So, at least in the case of LAC, equally acceptable
summary measures of income distribution can lead to completely different conclusions about the
effect of inequality on other development indicators. Conclusions derived with the use of
international secondary data sets could be also specific to the use of the Gini or quintile shares,
which are more readily available, but they might not be applicable for different ways of
summarizing information on the distribution.
4. Who, and Which Incomes, are Behind LAC Inequality?
So far we have taken a statistical approach to the question of what’s behind the inequality we
measure. In the rest of this paper we take a more economic-oriented perspective. We explore
what types of information household surveys convey and what they are really informative about.
In this section we approach the issue by taking a close look at some specific sections of the
distribution and at the importance of different income sources.
4.1 Where is Income Most Concentrated?
It is well established that LAC is the most unequal region in the world, but not much has been
said about the type of concentration that characterizes the distribution of these countries. One way
to illustrate this is to compare income differences across  deciles. Figure 4 presents these
comparisons by showing the ratio of the average income of each decile and the preceding one.
For instance, the second point in the horizontal axis compares the income of the second and first
deciles. In Bolivia the difference is about 3.2 times  and in Panama it reaches 2.7, while in
                                                       
40 In Forbes (2000) robustness tests are performed to verify if the conclusions of the paper hold when using
the ratio of the top and bottom quintiles to summarize the distribution, and the author’s results are
confirmed. The difference between using these types of indexes and the entropy measures is that entropy
indexes use information on the whole distribution, while the quintile shares ignore information on the
middle sections.31
Guatemala it is only 1.6 times. The figure also includes data for the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada (accessed through LIS) for reference.
Interestingly, the differences at the lower tail of the distribution are larger in the United
States than in several highly unequal LAC countries, such as Brazil and Chile. The United
Kingdom, where the difference is about 2 times, also registers greater disparities than about half
of the LAC countries. Thus, the reason why LAC has so much more inequality is not due to
income differences among the poorest deciles. The figure also plots the difference between the
third and second decile, the fourth and third, the fifth and fourth, and so on. In the middle part of
the distribution it is not possible to distinguish any LAC country from the USA, the UK, or
Canada, which indicates that the higher LAC inequality is not due to differences among the
middle deciles either.
The most important feature of the figure is that when the 10
th and the 9
th decile are
compared, all LAC countries stand out for their large disparities. In Paraguay, the country with
the highest conventional  Gini, the differences at the upper tail reach 3.5 times, while in
Guatemala, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia, the richest 10% of the population obtain incomes
around 3 times greater than the next 10%. The USA, the UK, and Canada are all at the bottom of
the figure with much smaller differences, not exceeding 1.6. The figure confirms the well-known
fact that the USA has higher inequality than other developed countries because of the differences
at the lower end of the distribution.
This evidence, added to the fact that the correlation between the conventional Gini and
the 10
th/9
th decile income ratio is .9, suggests that high LAC inequality is mainly a reflection of
the disproportionate incomes of the richest 10%. Actually, when comparing other points of the
distribution, inequality is even lower than that registered in much more equal developed
countries. The evidence in Section 2 suggests that the incomes at the top of the distribution in
LAC are grossly underestimated, but figure 4 shows that even so, the income of the richest
individuals that the surveys are able to capture is much higher than the remaining 90%.
To obtain a more precise idea about the importance of the concentration at the top of the
distribution in LAC, we estimate the Gini index by truncating the distribution at different points.
For instance, in the first column of Table 12 we exclude the richest 10 households in the survey
from the calculation. By excluding these observations, the average for the region drops by 1.3
points, but there are countries such as Paraguay where the Gini is much more sensitive to these
few observations. Rather than being the most unequal country in LAC, Paraguay ranks as the
third most unequal by excluding the ten richest households in each survey, due to a drop of32
almost 5 points in the Gini for this country. In contrast, the difference between the conventional
and the truncated Gini is negligible in the USA (at the bottom of the table).
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Table 12 also includes the truncated Gini excluding the richest 1%, 2%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. If the richest  1% is excluded, the average for the region drops by 5 points.
Guatemala and Paraguay are the most sensitive to this truncation. The exclusion of the richest 2%
results in an average decline of two additional points, while truncating the distribution in the 95
th
percentile implies a drop of around 11 points with respect to the conventional  Gini. This
reduction is significant, but still, most LAC countries continue to register higher inequality than
the truncated Gini for the USA.
When the richest 10% are excluded from the calculation,  the difference between the
average LAC country and the USA is reduced by 3.45 points. But the most important result is that
now 8 out of the 18 LAC countries present either lower inequality or a difference of less than 1.5
points with respect to the USA. This confirms that the differences between the typical LAC
country and the USA is mainly a reflection of a higher concentration at the top 10% of the
distribution in LAC. One of the clearest examples is Mexico, where the difference with the USA
is of 8.72 points when the conventional Gini is compared, but when the richest 10% are excluded
from the calculation in Mexico and the USA, Mexico appears to be slightly more equal.
According to Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1998), the highest incomes in household
surveys are usually measured with lower precision.
42 Interestingly, according to our results the
ranking of LAC countries, as well as the difference between each country and the USA, the UK,
and Canada are guided mostly by the incomes at the top of the distribution. The grounds on which
conclusions are made about the relative position of each country and the differences with other
regions, therefore, do not seem that solid. Furthermore, the results suggest that the inclusion of
observations for LAC in cross-country comparisons or in regressions with international secondary
data sets will introduce cross-country variation generated from observations with higher
                                                       
41 As noted by Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996), extreme observations such as the one outlier observed in
Paraguay are normally regarded as data “contamination”. Truncating the sample for instance, by excluding
the top observations is a common procedure in developed countries to avoid the inclusion of implausibly
high observations. So, the estimates presented in the table could also be interpreted as a “cleaner” ordering
that does not depend on these “more unreliable” observations.
42 In fact, in the research for developed countries it is common to top and bottom code incomes because
extreme observations are regarded as less reliable, but in LAC this is usually not done. There are some
exceptions such as Colombia, where the survey instrument for many years had top coding for incomes, but
apart from this case, we are not able to identify any others. In the 111 studies on income distribution and
poverty in LAC reviewed by Londoño and Székely (2000), very few references to this issue were found,
and it seems that the vast majority of the studies there is no attempt to top code. The conventional Gini for
the USA used here actually refers to a distribution truncated at the top 1%.33
measurement error. This might influence our impression about how LAC ranks in the world, and
about the effect of inequality on other development indicators.
A Profile of the Rich
Figure 4 raises the question of who are the individuals in the top 10% “generating” most
of the measurable inequality in LAC. To address this issue we obtain a profile of the richest 10%
of the population in each country by estimating a probit regression. The dependent variable is a
dummy indicating if an individual is located in the top  decile or not, and the independent
variables are dummies for all personal characteristics included in each survey (the characteristics
of the household head are used as reference).
Figure 5 summarizes the results by presenting the average value of the coefficient from
the country-specific regressions.
43 We present only the coefficients for the variables that are
statistically significant in the majority of cases. According to the results, living in a household
where the head has secondary or higher education, or reports being an employer or being
occupied as a professional or technician, are associated with the highest probabilities of belonging
to the richest 10%. Having primary education, being employed as director or manager, working in
the financial sector and living in urban areas are also associated with a positive significant
probability of belonging to the richest decile. In contrast, living in a household where the head is
a rural or manufacturer worker, is an employee or lives in households with children under 15
years of age, is associated with a negative probability of belonging to the top 10%. In 5 cases,
there is some information on ethnicity, and not surprisingly, belonging to an indigenous group
reduces the probability of belonging to the 10
th decile, by 12%.
Table 13 breaks down the income of the individuals in the top 10% into four sources:
labor, self-employment, non-labor income, and non-monetary income.  Income from self-
employment is normally classified by respondents as labor income, but usually it contains some
return to capital. It is difficult to identify the portion accruing to profits and the portion that is
strictly labor payments, but this clearly underestimates the value of profits. As shown in the table,
more than 80% of the incomes of the households in the richest 10% are reported to be labor
income in the average LAC country, but one of the reasons for this high value may be the
underestimation of profits from self-employment. To verify if this is the case, we divide the
                                                       
43 The country-specific results are not presented for brevity, but are available from the authors. All
variables were defined in the same way across countries to perform the regression. The results should only
be regarded as representing associations between the dependent and independent variables, since there is
potential endogeneity in the estimation.34
incomes of the self-employed into labor and profits by estimating an earnings regression for all
non-self-employed employees reporting labor income, where the dependent variable  is labor
earnings, and the independent variables are dummies for personal characteristics. We use the
coefficients to predict the income of the self-employed. The predicted is classified as labor
income under the idea that these are the earnings that the individual would obtain in the labor
market, and the residual is classified as profits. But even when performing this imputation,
around 60% of the incomes of the richest 10% are on average classified as labor. In Honduras,
Colombia, Venezuela and Costa Rica the proportion reaches around 70%, while there are only
three cases (Paraguay, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic) where labor income represents
less than 50% of the total.
These results, added to Figure 5, confirm that the profile of the average individual in the
top 10% of the distribution, where incomes are most concentrated, is closer to the prototype of
highly educated professionals obtaining labor incomes, rather than capital owners living on
profits. This does not imply that in LAC inequality is not generated by a small number of
individuals at the top of the distribution typically earning profits from capital investments. What
it reveals is that the inequality that we are able to measure with household surveys in LAC is
informative about a spectrum of society that does not include the richest households.
4.2 Which Types of Incomes are Behind the Concentration?
It is also of interest to determine which income distribution indicators are informative about. So
far we have provided evidence that the incomes of the rich may be grossly underestimated, and
one of the reasons might be the failure of the surveys to capture profits and capital incomes
accurately. To assess the proportion of inequality accounted for by the different types of incomes,
we apply the decomposition by factor components suggested by Shorrocks (1982).
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Table 14 presents the results. If self-employment incomes are classified as reported in the
surveys (that is, mostly as labor), on average, 80% of the overall inequality would be associated
with labor incomes. This high share is not surprising, and it is not exclusive for the LAC region.
For example, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) have argued that household surveys also capture
mainly labor incomes in developed countries.
                                                       
44 See Székely (1998) for a more detailed explanation, and Lerman (1999) for a review of alternative
methods. The advantage of following Shorrocks’ procedure is that the results are independent from the
choice of inequality index.35
Due to the possible overestimation of the role of labor in some activities, in this case we
also break down incomes from self-employment into labor and profits through imputation.
According to the table, on average 57.4% of the total inequality is accounted for by labor earnings
by employees, while 6.6% is from labor incomes from the self-employed. So, even when we
assign most of the income from self-employment to profits, almost two thirds of total inequality is
accounted for by labor incomes. The most extreme cases are, on the one hand, Paraguay, Panama,
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, where labor incomes account for more than 73%
of total inequality. On the other hand, Peru is the only country where labor incomes account for
less than 50%, but this is a clear exception to the rule.
Thus, most of the inequality that we are able to measure in LAC is from labor incomes.
This does not mean that in reality profits or capital incomes do not play a predominant role in the
generation of inequality, but rather that the household surveys have a limited capacity to
incorporate that type of information.
5. Conclusions
This paper takes a step back from the use of income distribution indicators estimated from
household surveys to explore what these numbers really are. Inequality indexes are being
increasingly used to evaluate economic performance and as explanatory variables for other
development indicators, but the quality of the data, the assumptions behind the calculations, and
the capacity to cover all population groups in society and all income sources, are far from
homogeneous. As a consequence, an important part of the cross-country differences observed are
simply due to disparities in the way in which the data is originated and treated, rather than
genuine differences in distribution.
We divide our exploration into two broad parts. First we take a statistical approach to
investigate the differences in the characteristics and the treatment of the data. Second, we focus
on a more economic-oriented perspective by examining which sectors of the population and
which types of income distribution measures are more informative about.
The analysis is based on recent household surveys for 18 LAC countries, most of which
are typically included in secondary data sets. In terms of the characteristics and comparability of
the data, the analysis covers survey frames, sample size, quality and coverage of population
subgroups at the extremes of the distribution, as well as differences in income sources and timing
of the survey. The results suggest that LAC household surveys severely underestimate inequality36
because they do not include information on the richest sectors of society, and that a considerable
part of the cross-country disparities are driven by differences in the way the data is collected,
rather than genuine distributive differences. Furthermore, once data differences are accounted for,
at least in a very general way, our understanding of the relation between inequality and growth
changes from a strong positive connection to no statistical relation at all.
The tradition in LAC is to focus on the distribution of household per capita income by
discarding zero and missing values and using the Gini coefficient as a summary measure of
inequality. But by adopting other equally valid assumptions about economies of scale in
consumption, adult equivalence scales, and the treatment of missing and zero incomes
consistently in the same way in all countries, we observe that some distributions are more
sensitive to these choices. But in reality, secondary data and other compilations of  Gini
coefficients from published sources are far from having methodological consistency. Rather, they
mix methodological choices by different authors that are usually not even documented. We
perform an experiment to assess at least in a general way the effect of lack of methodological
consistency. We find that inconsistency has the potential for completely blurring our impression
about how unequal countries are, and about the relation between growth and inequality. The
choice of inequality measure can also change country rankings and the view about the effect of
inequality on economic growth.
A close examination of each distribution reveals that although surveys fail to cover the
richest individuals, the Latin American inequality we observe is still mainly reflecting a
disproportionate concentration of income among the top 10% of the population covered by the
surveys. The profile of individuals in the richest 10% in the surveys corresponds to highly
educated professionals whose main income source is labor income earned as employees. A
decomposition of inequality by sources reveals that, similarly to other countries, the LAC
inequality is mainly informative about the distribution of labor incomes.
In sum, our main conclusion is that although household surveys are the best source of
data for the measurement of inequality, it is crucial to remember when using these numbers that
there is an important story behind each number. This story influences our judgement about how
unequal countries are and about the relation between inequality and other development indicators,
but it is seldom told or known. Perhaps other statistics commonly used in economics also have
their own interesting story, and it might be worth trying to find out what it is.
45
                                                       
45 A recent example in this line is the paper by Ward and Dikhanov (1999), who present some interesting
insights into the use of inflation measures.37
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Standard errors for the Gini index41
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Income Ratio of Successive Deciles43
Figure 5
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Head's Characteristics and Probability
of Being in the Top 10%44
Table 1
    Income Distribution in Latin America and Other Regions
     Conventional Gini Coefficient
Gini Year Country Rank
Latin America
62.03 1995 Paraguay  1
59.06 1996 Brazil 2
58.77 1996 Bolivia 3
57.55 1997 Panama  4
56.70 1997 Colombia 5
56.69 1993 Nicaragua 6
56.38 1996 Chile 7
56.00 1995 Ecuador 8
55.69 1998 Guatemala  9
52.84 1996 Honduras 10
52.76 1996 Mexico 11
50.55 1997 Peru 12
50.50 1995 El Salvador 13
49.63 1997 Venezuela 14
48.10 1996 Dominican Republic 15
47.02 1996 Argentina* 16
45.89 1997 Costa Rica  17
42.62 1997 Uruguay* 18
53.27 Average
OECD Countries
44.04 1994 United States





















Quality Indicators of Household Surveys
                 Comparison with National Accounts                                                                           Self-employment
Gini after adjusting labor income Labor income               Gini excluding the Self-employed
to labor income in NA in HH survey                            self-employed in informal sector Country
as (%) of labor as (%) of all
Gini Rank income in NA Gini Rank income earners
62.08 1 0.86 65.44 1 24.8 Paraguay 1
59.17 3 1.15 60.28 4 25.1 Brazil 2
59.52 2 1.47 61.42 3 23.1 Bolivia 3
57.57 4 0.92 58.17 7 20.9 Panama 4
56.68 6 0.96 56.48 8 34.1 Colombia 5
56.69 5 52.09 13 31.6 Nicaragua 6
56.21 7 1.28 60.12 5 19.1 Chile 7
55.57 9 0.79 56.25 11 30.4 Ecuador 8
55.69 8 62.36 2 32.6 Guatemala 9
52.84 10 1.05 54.56 12 41.1 Honduras 10
51.80 11 0.83 56.34 10 24.0 Mexico 11
49.47 13 1.57 58.24 6 46.6 Peru 12
50.35 12 1.08 56.35 9 25.7 El Salvador 13
49.02 14 0.68 51.58 15 31.6 Venezuela 14
48.25 16 0.66 51.78 14 30.7 Dominican Republic 15
48.50 15 0.57 48.58 16 22.0 Argentina 16
45.95 17 0.75 47.06 17 20.2 Costa Rica 17
42.82 18 1.24 45.57 18 21.6 Uruguay 18
53.2 1.0 55.7 28.1 LAC Average
0.98 0.86 Correlation with conventional Gini
Source: Authors'calculations.
Notes: GDP figures taken from IDB (1999). Figures for labor income as a share of GDP 
are from CEPAL (1998). Exchange rates are from IDB (1998).
Incomes at the Top and Bottom of the Distribution
Price Waterhouse+   Monthly Incomes from household survey (USD) Country
Richest  Richest  Monthly Richest 10 richest 10 poorest
individual in 10 households in income  Individual households households
survey vs. survey vs. for typical in survey in survey in survey
typical manager typical manager Manager
26.56 4.63 6,114 162,404 28,335 3.0 Paraguay*
5.76 2.13 7,034 40,500 14,957 1.5 Ecuador*
3.12 1.93 8,950 27,930 17,241 49.9 Uruguay
3.91 1.93 16,757 65,510 32,359 1.5 Chile
2.65 1.90 9,706 25,683 18,436 17.7 Guatemala
2.16 1.31 29,050 62,871 37,974 2.2 Brazil
1.21 0.87 14,455 17,548 12,559 2.3 Panama**
1.42 0.88 8,086 11,516 7,096 3.1 El Salvador
1.15 0.69 32,212 37,050 22,232 12.1 Argentina
1.06 0.69 9,718 10,302 6,693 14.1 Peru
0.89 0.63 9,248 8,189 5,782 0.6 Bolivia*
1.74 0.52 22,570 39,210 11,821 11.8 Mexico
0.90 0.61 8,426 7,607 5,170 3.1 Honduras
0.61 0.48 11,619 7,039 5,594 7.7 Costa Rica
1.39 0.50 12,106 16,852 6,030 2.3 Nicaragua
0.51 0.30 29,167 14,878 8,737 0.6 Venezuela
16,711 1.2 Colombia
9,357 6,717 5.0 Dominican Republic
3.44 1.25 14,819 33,203 14,573 7.76 LAC Average
Source: Authors'calculations. Price Waterhouse incomes are taken from America Economia (1999).
*Since incomes for managers from the largest firms were unavailable, managerial incomes from the largest possible firms were used 
instead. An adjustment was made by taking the average difference by firm size in the other countries.
**Salaries for general managers were not reported. The salary for financial managers was taken instead, and an adjustment was
based on the income difference between general and finance managers of countries with similar income per capita.46
Table 4
Table 5
Income Sources Covered by Each Survey
Non-Monetary Property Capital Non-Labor Labor  Country



















Inequality with Comparable Sources, Geographic Coverage and Timing
                 Adjusted Gini Labor Income Labor Income Rank for
Change Urban Areas Country Conventional
in Rank Gini Rank Gini Rank Gini Rank Gini
(9) (8) (7) (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
-1 57.21 2 57.44 1 62.67 1 Paraguay  1
-1 56.26 3 57.26 3 59.64 2 Brazil 2
-4 51.51 7 51.42 10 58.05 5 Bolivia 3
-5 49.51 9 52.88 8 56.78 7 Panama  4
-10 46.46 15 53.97 6 56.60 10 Colombia 5
-5 48.24 11 53.05 7 56.69 9 Nicaragua 6
2 54.08 5 57.42 2 58.45 4 Chile 7
7 57.69 1 52.56 9 56.72 8 Ecuador 8
-5 47.12 14 54.23 5 59.59 3 Guatemala  9
-3 47.52 13 49.36 13 53.01 12 Honduras 10
7 55.00 4 55.79 4 58.00 6 Mexico 11
4 50.16 8 46.37 17 53.01 11 Peru 12
-3 41.93 16 47.02 16 51.16 13 El Salvador 13
4 48.51 10 49.51 12 49.51 14 Venezuela 14
3 48.24 12 50.06 11 48.41 16 Dominican Republic 15
10 51.81 6 48.54 14 48.54 15 Argentina 16
0 41.15 17 44.34 18 45.82 18 Costa Rica  17
0 34.05 18 47.92 15 47.92 17 Uruguay 18




Month of the Year When Survey is Held



















Estimation of Growth Regressions
                                                                  (Dependent Variable: Annual Per Capita Growth)
       Regression with  LAC Data** Regression with world-wide DS Data
Adjusted Gini Conventional Forbes Forbes Independent
Gini Labor  Gini Regression Regression (1) Variable
Income no grouping (5-year periods)
by period**
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)
0.00117 0.00092 0.00165 0.0018 0.0036 Gini
(0.30) (1.07) (1.9) (1.94) (2.4)
-0.01954 -0.02368 -0.02353 -0.0289 -0.076 Ln GNP per capita
(2.3) (-2.5) (2.5) (2.9) (3.8)
-0.08237 -0.07754 -0.08121 -0.0516 -0.014 Male Education
(0.91) (0.82) (0.84) (1.55) (0.45)
0.10476 0.09482 0.09829 0.0684 0.07 Female Education
(2.2) (1.83) (1.76) (2.2) (2.18)
-0.00038 -0.00013 -0.00093 -0.0009 -0.0008 PPPI
(2.1) (2.26) (1.15) (3.75) (2.6)
0.24 0.27 0.27 0.59 0.67 R-squared
11 11 11 56 45 Countries
42 42 42 462 180 Observations
1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1965-95 1965-95 Period
*Source: Forbes (2000), Table 3.
t' Statistics in parenthesis
**Source: Authors'calculations48
Table 8
                              Gini Coefficient with Different Ways of Treating the Data
  Treatment of Missings and Zero's % obs. with Gini with Gini with Rank for
   Impute missing & Impute missing adult economies Country Conventional
    use zero incomes missing & and/or  zero equivalence of scale in Gini
Gini Rank zero's incomes scales consumption
62.40 2 62.06 1.9 59.36 59.80 Paraguay  1
60.05 3 59.44 4.3 57.12 57.24 Brazil 2
59.87 4 58.87 8.0 56.70 57.32 Bolivia 3
58.32 5 57.72 7.1 55.43 55.70 Panama  4
57.92 6 56.69 3.3 55.02 54.87 Colombia 5
65.37 1 57.72 22.6 54.64 54.67 Nicaragua 6
56.45 7 56.37 0.5 53.58 54.82 Chile 7
56.00 8 55.95 5.9 54.01 54.08 Ecuador 8
55.69 9 55.69 0.0 51.71 52.61 Guatemala  9
54.82 10 53.33 9.1 50.56 50.70 Honduras 10
51.71 13 51.70 0.0 49.16 48.87 Mexico 11
50.57 14 50.54 0.6 47.91 48.70 Peru 12
52.19 12 50.54 0.7 48.00 48.28 El Salvador 13
53.12 11 49.82 23.3 47.22 47.25 Venezuela 14
48.34 16 48.11 0.5 46.40 46.58 Dominican Republic 15
49.10 15 47.99 11.3 44.20 44.45 Argentina 16
46.17 17 45.73 16.8 43.52 44.03 Costa Rica  17
42.64 18 42.62 0.0 40.10 40.02 Uruguay 18
54.48 53.38 6.45 50.81 51.11 LAC Average
Source: Authors'calculations.49
Table 9
Gini Coefficient with Methodology Chosen Randomly
Table 10
Gini 3rd. Draw Gini 2nd. Draw Gini 1st. Draw Conv. Gini
59.87 4 Bol 62.03 1 Par 59.36 3 Par 62.03 Par
59.36 3 Par 60.05 4 Bra 57.55 1 Pan 59.06 Bra
58.32 4 Pan 58.32 4 Pan 57.12 3 Bra 58.77 Bol
57.24 2 Bra 57.92 4 Col 56.70 3 Bol 57.55 Pan
56.69 1 Nic 57.32 2 Bol 56.00 4 Ecu 56.70 Col
56.38 1 Chi 56.69 1 Nic 55.69 4 Gua 56.69 Nic
56.00 4 Ecu 56.38 1 Chi 55.02 3 Col 56.38 Chi
54.87 2 Col 56.00 4 Ecu 54.64 3 Nic 56.00 Ecu
52.84 1 Hon 54.82 4 Hon 53.58 3 Chi 55.69 Gua
52.19 4 ElS 52.76 1 Mex 50.70 2 Hon 52.84 Hon
51.71 3 Gua 52.61 2 Gua 50.55 1 Per 52.76 Mex
50.55 1 Per 52.19 4 ElS 49.63 1 Ven 50.55 Per
48.87 2 Mex 50.57 4 Per 49.16 3 Mex 50.50 ElS
47.22 3 Ven 47.22 3 Ven 48.28 2 ElS 49.63 Ven
46.58 2 DRep 46.58 2 DRep 48.10 1 DRep 48.10 DRep
45.89 1 Cri 44.20 3 Arg 45.89 1 Cri 47.02 Arg
44.45 2 Arg 44.03 2 Cri 44.45 2 Arg 45.89 Cri
42.64 4 Uru 42.64 4 Uru 42.64 4 Uru 42.62 Uru
Correlation of ranks
Source: Authors' calculations.
Gini 6th. Draw Gini 5th. Draw Gini 4th. Draw
62.40 4 Par 60.05 4 Bra 62.40 4 Par
58.77 1 Bol 59.80 2 Par 60.05 4 Bra
57.92 4 Col 58.77 1 Bol 58.32 4 Pan
57.24 2 Bra 57.55 1 Pan 57.32 2 Bol
56.38 1 Chi 56.70 1 Col 56.69 1 Nic
55.70 2 Pan 54.64 3 Nic 56.00 4 Ecu
55.69 1 Gua 54.08 2 Ecu 55.02 3 Col
54.64 3 Nic 53.58 3 Chi 53.58 3 Chi
54.08 2 Ecu 52.61 2 Gua 51.71 3 Gua
52.84 1 Hon 51.71 4 Mex 50.70 2 Hon
50.55 1 Per 50.70 2 Hon 49.63 1 Ven
50.50 1 ElS 48.10 1 DRep 49.16 3 Mex
48.87 2 Mex 48.00 3 ElS 48.34 4 DRep
47.22 3 Ven 47.91 3 Per 48.00 3 ElS
47.02 1 Arg 47.22 3 Ven 47.91 3 Per
46.58 2 DRep 44.20 3 Arg 44.45 2 Arg
43.52 3 Cri 44.03 2 Cri 43.52 3 Cri
40.10 3 Uru 42.62 1 Uru 40.10 3 Uru
Gini with Random Methodology, and Entropy Indexes
Dependent Variable: Entropy Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient
Bottom- Top- Fifth Fourth Third Second First Independent
sensitive sensitive draw draw draw draw draw Variable
Entropy Entropy
(a=-1) (a=1)
-0.0038 0.0055 -0.0010 0.0018 0.0001 0.0031 0.0017 Inequality index
(1.7) (2.4) (0.73) (2.42) (0.09) (2.04) (1.9)
-0.0215 -0.0273 -0.0166 -0.0261 -0.0198 -0.0287 -0.0255 Ln GNP per capita
(2.6) (3.2) (1.93) -3.1000 (2.2) (3.0) (2.8)
-0.0231 -0.0363 -0.0121 -0.0704 -0.0232 -0.1377 -0.0771 Male Education
(0.26) (0.45) (1.3) (0.92) (1.26) (1.4) (0.95)
0.0501 0.0663 0.0136 0.0869 0.0466 0.1508 0.0966 Female Education
(1.82) (1.93) (1.6) (1.92) (1.89) (1.77) (1.87)
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0006 PPPI
(1.48) (1.58) (1.3) (1.78) (1.65) (0.4) (1.04)
0.32 0.38 0.26 0.35 0.24 0.34 0.32 R-squared
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 Countries
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 Observations
1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 1979-1998 Period




                   Inequality with Truncated Distributions
    Difference with USA Excluding
Truncated Conventional Richest Richest Richest Richest Richest Country
at 10% 10% 5% 2% 1% 10 hhs
7.62 17.99 42.88 47.02 51.19 53.61 57.36 Paraguay  1
8.49 15.02 43.75 48.14 52.40 54.60 58.91 Brazil 2
9.39 14.72 44.66 48.37 51.93 53.84 57.37 Bolivia 3
8.63 13.50 43.89 47.44 51.12 53.15 56.98 Panama  4
4.42 12.66 39.68 43.75 47.67 49.71 54.19 Colombia 5
7.03 12.65 42.29 45.51 49.38 51.47 55.21 Nicaragua 6
3.45 12.33 38.71 43.47 48.39 51.10 55.75 Chile 7
4.56 11.95 39.83 43.87 48.03 50.15 53.79 Ecuador 8
1.42 11.64 36.69 40.99 45.32 47.87 52.50 Guatemala  9
3.42 8.80 38.68 42.18 45.57 47.60 51.75 Honduras 10
-1.27 8.72 34.00 39.01 42.08 46.21 52.08 Mexico 11
1.57 6.50 36.84 40.03 43.75 45.89 49.38 Peru 12
1.29 6.45 36.55 39.98 43.64 45.82 49.38 El Salvador 13
1.79 5.58 37.06 40.51 43.86 45.60 48.97 Venezuela 14
0.08 4.06 35.34 39.05 42.68 44.52 47.44 Dominican Republic 15
0.67 2.98 35.94 39.34 42.58 44.19 47.48 Argentina 16
-0.17 1.85 35.10 38.22 41.19 42.73 45.53 Costa Rica  17
-2.75 -1.42 32.52 35.61 38.46 39.89 42.46 Uruguay 18
3.31 9.22 38.58 42.36 46.07 48.22 52.03 LAC Average
35.27 37.82 40.52 42.03 43.96 USA
Source: Authors'calculations.
  Inequality measured with alternative indices
      Entropy with a=1       Entropy with a=-1 Rank for
Change Change Country Conventional
in Rank E(1) Rank in Rank E(-1) Rank Gini
0 1.02 1 3 1.63 4 Paraguay  1
2 0.69 4 6 1.34 8 Brazil 2
0 0.69 3 4 1.34 7 Bolivia 3
3 0.64 7 -1 1.82 3 Panama  4
-3 0.83 2 0 1.56 5 Colombia 5
0 0.64 6 -4 2.29 2 Nicaragua 6
-2 0.66 5 2 1.05 9 Chile 7
10 0.21 18 -7 2.36 1 Ecuador 8
-1 0.62 8 5 0.74 14 Guatemala  9
0 0.57 10 1 0.83 11 Honduras 10
-2 0.59 9 2 0.75 13 Mexico 11
-1 0.50 11 0 0.80 12 Peru 12
3 0.31 16 -3 0.96 10 El Salvador 13
-2 0.47 12 -8 1.47 6 Venezuela 14
-2 0.43 13 0 0.74 15 Dominican Republic 15
-2 0.42 14 0 0.66 16 Argentina 16
-2 0.38 15 0 0.63 17 Costa Rica  17




                               Income Sources for Households
                  In the Top 10% of the Per Capita Distribution
          Shares ot Total Income
non- non-labor                    Income from  Labor  Country
monetary income                self-employment* income
income capital labor Total employees
12.3 46.4 13.1 59.5 28.2 Paraguay  1
20.9 23.0 15.8 38.7 40.4 Brazil 2
19.9 29.2 15.0 44.2 35.9 Bolivia 3
26.8 6.8 5.7 12.5 60.7 Panama  4
15.0 17.8 14.3 32.2 52.8 Colombia 5
34.9 13.8 48.6 51.4 Nicaragua 6
4.0 14.6 30.4 17.0 47.4 34.0 Chile 7
8.5 16.1 24.0 13.6 37.6 37.8 Ecuador 8
12.3 13.3 25.9 13.3 39.3 35.1 Guatemala  9
29.9 16.4 46.3 53.7 Honduras 10
23.4 10.3 13.9 7.2 21.1 45.2 Mexico 11
13.7 18.9 13.0 11.4 24.4 43.0 Peru 12
3.3 17.5 19.4 11.8 31.2 48.0 El Salvador 13
5.7 19.6 16.8 36.4 57.9 Venezuela 14
20.3 31.8 13.8 45.6 34.1 Dominican Republic 15
21.8 15.4 9.5 24.9 53.3 Argentina 16
14.0 12.1 11.5 23.6 62.4 Costa Rica  17
15.1 25.4 6.1 16.4 22.5 36.9 Uruguay 18
11.5 17.0 22.2 13.1 35.3 45.0 LAC Average
*Incomes from self-employment are split into labor and capita through imputation methods
Source: Authors' calculations
                     Decomposition of Inequality by Income Source
(%) of Total Inequality
non- non-labor                    Income from  Labor  Country
monetary income                self-employment* income
income capital labor Total employees
5.49 11.81 2.15 13.96 80.55 Paraguay  1
17.95 13.59 8.33 21.92 60.13 Brazil 2
25.79 19.89 7.77 27.66 46.54 Bolivia 3
21.11 4.58 3.48 8.06 70.83 Panama  4
18.40 12.50 9.47 21.97 59.63 Colombia 5
11.32 5.11 16.43 83.57 Nicaragua 6
3.81 20.80 9.30 3.59 12.89 62.50 Chile 7
4.96 8.32 6.27 2.42 8.69 78.03 Ecuador 8
13.25 13.91 19.05 6.84 25.89 46.95 Guatemala  9
28.15 10.77 38.92 61.08 Honduras 10
17.41 5.56 8.42 4.55 12.97 64.06 Mexico 11
9.26 37.86 9.92 5.67 15.59 37.29 Peru 12
3.80 19.94 12.58 8.09 20.67 55.59 El Salvador 13
6.23 15.47 10.54 26.01 67.76 Venezuela 14
19.96 20.97 10.93 31.90 48.14 Dominican Republic 15
24.09 8.55 10.20 18.74 57.16 Argentina 16
17.38 9.52 9.07 18.59 64.04 Costa Rica  17
13.93 24.55 6.28 8.64 14.92 46.60 Uruguay 18
9.5 18.0 12.7 7.1 19.8 60.6 LAC Average
*Incomes from self-employment are split into labor and capita through imputation methods
Source: Authors' calculationsAppendix Table A1
Description of Household Surveys                                                                      Household Survey General Description
Geographic Recall Sample Survey Name Year Country
Coverage Periods Frame (Origninal Name in Spanish (Portugese))
(Months) (Census Year)
Urban 1 1991 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 1996 Argentina
National 0 1992 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo 1996 Bolivia
National 0 1991 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios 1996 Brazil
National 1 1992 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional 1996 Chile
National 0 1984 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 1997 Costa Rica
National 0 1993 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo 1997 Colombia
National 0 1993 Encuesta Nacional de  Fuerza de Trabajo 1996 Dominican Republic
National 1 1990 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 1995 Ecuador
National 0 1992 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 1995 El Salvador
National 3 1994 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos Familiares 1998 Guatemala
National 1 1988 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 1996 Honduras
National 1 1995 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares 1996 Mexico
National 0 1991 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida 1993 Nicaragua
National 0 1992 Encuesta de Hogares - Mano de Obra 1995 Paraguay
National 1 1990 Encuesta de Hogares 1997 Panama
National 1 1993 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida 1997 Peru
Urban 1 1985 Encuesta Continua de Hogares 1997 Uruguay
National 1 1990 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra 1997 Venezuela53
Table A2
Household Surveys Used in Growth Regressions
Country Year Name of the survey Reference
Month for Incomes Households Individuals Labor Property Rent  Capital Rent Transfers Non-Monetary Imputed Rent
1 Bolivia 96 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo June 8,311                35,648           X X X X n.a. n.a.
2 97 Encuesta Nacional de Empleo November 8,461                36,752           X X X X n.a. n.a.
3 Brazil 81 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 103,193            481,480         X X X X n.a. n.a.
4 83 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 113,599            511,147         X X X X n.a. n.a.
5 86 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 65,277              289,533         X X X X n.a. n.a.
6 88 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 68,833              298,031         X X X X n.a. n.a.
7 92 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 78,188              317,145         X X X X n.a. n.a.
8 93 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 80,054              322,011         X X X X n.a. n.a.
9 95 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 85,167              334,106         X X X X n.a. n.a.
10 96 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios September 84,862              331,142         X X X X n.a. n.a.
11 Chile 87 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional November 22,719              97,044           X X X X X X
12 90 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional October 25,793              105,189         X X X X X X
13 92 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional October 27,666              110,555         X X X X X X
14 94 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional October 45,379              178,057         X X X X X X
15 96 Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional October 33,636              134,262         X X X X X X
16 Colombia 95 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo September 18,255              79,012           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
17 97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Fuerza de Trabajo September 32,442              143,398         X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
18 Costa Rica 81 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Empleo y Desempleo July 6,604                22,170           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
19 83 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Empleo y Desempleo July 7,132                23,449           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
20 85 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares - Empleo y Desempleo July 7,351                23,960           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
21 87 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 7,510                34,591           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
22 89 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 7,637                34,368           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
23 91 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 8,002                35,565           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
24 93 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 8,696                37,703           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
25 95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 9,631                40,613           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
26 97 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples July 9,923                41,277           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
27 Dominican Republic 96 Encuesta Nacional de  Fuerza de Trabajo February 5,548                24,041           X X X X n.a. n.a.
28 Ecuador 95 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida July-Sept. 5,810                26,941           X X X X X X
29 El Salvador 95 Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples 1995 8,482                40,004           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. X
30 Honduras 89 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples August 8,727                46,672           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
31 92 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples August 4,757                24,704           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
32 96 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples August 6,428                33,172           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
33 98 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples February 6,493                32,696           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
34 Mexico 84 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares Third quarter 4,735                23,985           X X X X X X
35 89 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares Third quarter 11,531              57,289           X X X X X X
36 92 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares Third quarter 10,530              50,862           X X X X X X
37 94 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares Third quarter 12,815              60,365           X X X X X X
38 96 Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso Gasto de los Hogares Third quarter 14,042              64,916           X X X X X X
39 Nicaragua 93 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Sobre Medicion de Niveles de Vida February to June 4,455                24,542           X X X X X X
40 Panama 79 Encuesta Continua de Hogares - Mano de Obra July 8,593                24,284           X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
41 91 Encuesta Continua de Hogares - Mano de Obra July 8,867                38,000           X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
42 95 Encuesta Continua de Hogares  July 9,875                40,320           X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
43 97 Encuesta de Hogares July 9,897                39,706           X Xa Xa X n.a. n.a.
44 Paraguay 95 Encuesta de Hogares - Mano de Obra August to November 4,667                21,910           X X X X n.a. n.a.
45 Peru 85-86 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida July 1985 to July 1986 5,108                26,323           X X X X X X
46 91 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida August-October 2,308                11,507           X Xa Xa X X X
47 94 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medición de Niveles de Vida April-June 3,623                18,662           X Xa Xa X X X
48 96 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza April-June 16,744              88,863           X Xa Xa X X X
49 97 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Niveles de Vida y Pobreza August-October 3,843                19,575           X Xa Xa X X X
50 Venezuela 81 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 45,421              239,649         X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
51 86 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 129,713            682,636         X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
52 89 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 61,385              315,650         X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
53 93 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 61,477              306,629         X n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
54 95 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 18,702              92,450           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
55 97 Encuesta de Hogares por Muestra Second semester 15,948              76,965           X Xb Xb Xb n.a. n.a.
a. Can not separate between property and capital rent.
b. Can not separate between property rent, capital rent, and transfers.
Sample size Income